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Ever since the events of 1989, the scholarly interest in the Eastern European transition 
processes has been enormous, resulting in a huge body of literature, which tries to describe 
and explain what is going on in the region. Following the breakdown of the Communist 
rule, the 27 post-communist countries have taken different political and economic 
trajectories, which have resulted in consolidated democracy and market economy in about 
one third of the countries, in unconsolidated democracy or transitional regimes and 
economies in about a dozen and authoritarian regimes and consolidated statist economies 
in the rest (Nation in Transit, 2002 & 2004. See appendix for details). In accordance with 
the project’s purpose, this chapter focuses on the scholarly attempts to explain the huge 
variation in political and economic outcomes of the transition processes in the post-
communist countries. Although good in-depth descriptive studies are prerequisites for 
subsequent theory-driven research, this strand of transition literature is left out in this 
survey. It should be noted, however, that each chapter contains further elaborations on 
more specific aspects of transition research. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, one of the core ideas of the project is to study 
the transition processes from a cross-disciplinary perspective. Accordingly, this research 
review is also taking an integrative approach, by analyzing explanations for both political 
and economic outcomes within the same framework, instead of treating the processes 
separately, which has usually been the case.1 Naturally, the political and economic 
transitions have been studied from several perspectives, resulting in a plethora of theories 
explaining the outcome. Regardless of the approach, however, what unites these studies is 
that they all have to consider to what extent historical legacies – of distant or recent origins 
– influence the outcome of the transition. This applies not only to scholars who explicitly 
focus on different types of historic legacies, but also to those who stress the importance of 
the reforms pursued in the 1990s and who thereby – deliberately or not – downplay the 
significance of historic legacies. A ‘temporal framework’, is thus appropriate, because it 
allows for the inclusion of most types of explanations for the outcome of both the political 
and economic transitions. This chapter is structured according to how far back in time 
scholars consider it necessary to go, in order to explain the varieties of transition, which 
were previously referred to. This structuring principle is however more than a mere 
categorization of different types of explanations. It also allows us to map systematically 
the main similarities and differences regarding how scholars view the economic and 
political transitions: how different time periods and historic legacies are perceived, what 
specific factors are considered important, the extent to which the policymakers are 
perceived to have the ability to influence the outcome etc. It should be emphasized, 
however that the purpose is neither evaluative nor exhaustive, but rather illustrative, 
                                              
1 An increasing number of studies are trying to integrate the political and economic transition processes, 
though. See for example Offe (1996); Elster et al (1998) and Nørgaard (2000). 
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demonstrating the great variety of perspectives and explanations used in the transition 
literature.  
Even though some experiments with political and economic reforms had been pursued 
in some of the countries dominated by the Soviet Union during the communist period, the 
transition process – in some cases towards democracy and market economy – did not 
begin before the overthrow of the socialist dictatorships, which started in 1989. The events 
of 1989 are thus regarded as a watershed in the transition process, but exactly what 1989 
represents and its particular impact are however a subject of disagreement. Three basic 
perspectives can be singled out. The first perspective emphasizes the importance of the 
decisions made during and in the immediate aftermath of the upheavals in 1989; the 
second perspective emphasizes the importance of the reforms pursued during the post-
communist period after 1989 and the third perspective, finally, stresses the importance of 
the historic legacies and the period(s) before 1989. In order to avoid confusion by jumping 
back and forth in the Eastern European history, this chapter is organized chronologically, 
starting in the distant past, i.e. the period up to 1945. Next, the recent past - i.e. the impact 
of the Communist experience2 - is analyzed, followed by the events around 1989. The last 
section deals with the post-communist period. Before turning to the explanations, a few 
words on what is to be explained seem appropriate.  
The central question in transition studies is what determines the different political and 
economic trajectories taken following the fall of the Communist regimes, with the 
emphasis on democratization and marketization (King, 2000 p 145). Normatively, a 
transition is successfully completed when a consolidated democracy and a functioning 
market economy are established. Even though democracy is a highly contested concept, 
there is a quite broad consensus on its basic components, such as free and fair elections 
with comprehensive voting rights, political rights and freedoms and the rule of law (See 
for example Gill, 2000 pp 2-3).3  Most studies, as well as indexes and rankings thus put the 
post-communist countries in more or less the same order. Concerning democratic 
consolidation paradoxically, there seems to be a similar consensus about the ranking order, 
although there is no common understanding of the concept (Schedler, 1998 pp 91-92; 
Kopecky & Mudde, 2000 p 519).4 Where to draw the line between consolidated and 
unconsolidated democracies nonetheless still remains a bone of contention (Kopecky & 
Mudde, 2000 p 522). The disagreement among scholars over how to explain the political 
outcome is therefore not the result of a disagreement over the democratic status in the 
post-communist counties. 
A market economy is characterized by the dominance of free market forces and its 
central components are competition between producers, prices determined by demand and 
supply and institutions protecting property and contract rights. The definition of a 
                                              
2 For those countries that belonged to the Soviet Union from the very beginning, the Communist experience 
started already around 1920. 
3 The European Union, for example, decided at the summit in Copenhagen in 1993 to have stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and human rights and functioning market economy as conditions for 
membership (www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm#Accession%20criteria). 
4 Usually democratic consolidation denotes the expectations of the survival of a democratic system, i.e. when 
democracy is “the only game in town”, i.e. not contested by any significant group in the country.  See for 
example Linz & Stepan, 1996 p 6; Kopecky & Mudde, 2000 p 534, footnote 3. On different definitions, see 
Kopecky & Mudde, 2000 pp 521). 
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functioning market economy is somewhat more demanding, adding among other things 
macroeconomic stability and the channeling of savings towards productive investments.5  
There is quite a difference between studies, which assess political reforms on the one 
hand and studies, which asses economic reforms on the other, in the sense that the former 
usually uses the existence of democracy or consolidated democracy as indicators of 
successful reforms, whereas the latter often uses other indicators such as growth, 
privatization etc, which are related to, but not the same as those, which define the 
existence of a market economy. This will be discussed further when it is relevant in the 
following sections. 
The distant past: historic legacies matter 
Many scholars who analyze the Eastern European transition emphasize that historic 
legacies matter (Dryzek & Holmes, 2002; Fowkes, 1999; Gerner et al, 1995; Grugel, 
2002). A common assumption of this approach is that historical phases, such as 
Communism, the Ottoman and Mongol periods and specific institutions established long 
ago, such as the Christian Orthodox Church, have shaped popular belief-patterns and 
thereby the political culture in the region, which in turn has had a large impact on the post-
communist trajectories towards democracy and market economy. This approach is called 
path dependence and will be explained in more detail in the following section. Scholars 
differ, however, on how far back in time it is relevant to go, as well as on the possibilities 
to change negative patterns. This section focuses on the period up to World War II. 
Even though most scholars who adhere to this perspective focus on the recent past, i.e. 
the Communist period, quite a few also emphasize the importance of the more distant past 
for the political and economic development after the fall of the Berlin wall. Generally 
speaking, one could say that the further back in time scholars put the emphasis, the more 
the transition process is viewed as determined by history and thus the smaller the scope for 
transition actors to influence the outcome.  
Gerner et al (1995) take us as far back as to the late Roman Empire (AD 300s) in their 
search for the origins of the outcome of the transition. They argue that the division 
between East and West runs along religious lines, where the successful countries are those 
on the “right” side of the “brain curtain”6, i.e. the Western Christian ones. They identify a 
number of crucial differences between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, which are said to be 
responsible for the emergence of different mentalities and political cultures in the East and 
West and which subsequently to a large extent are believed to have determined the 
political and economic trajectories that were taken, eventually resulting in the outcome of 
                                              
5 The EU assesses the existence of a functioning market economy on the basis of the following factors: 
Equilibrium between demand and supply is established by the free interplay of market forces; Prices, as well 
as trade, are liberalized; Significant barriers to market entry (establishment of new firms) and exit 
(bankruptcies) are absent; The legal system, including the regulation of property rights, is in place; Laws and 
contracts can be enforced; Macroeconomic stability has been achieved including adequate price stability and 
sustainable public finances and external accounts; Broad consensus about the essentials of economic policy; 
The financial sector is sufficiently well developed to channel savings towards productive investment 
(European Commission 1998 p 6). 
6 In Swedish brain and iron is pronounced the same way and the title of the book (Brain curtain) is thus 
alluding  to Churchill’s Iron curtain but implies that there is a mental barrier between East and West. 
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today’s transition. Firstly, there was a split in the West in the relationship between the 
church and the secular power, resulting in a more pluralistic and dynamic society, which 
stimulated debate over legal matters and thereby laid the foundation to the rule of law and 
constitutionalism. In the East by contrast there was no separation between the religious 
and secular power and the former prevailed, which resulted in a society dominated by 
religious dogmas and in which critical debate and even scientific research were forbidden. 
Secondly, the Catholic invention of and subsequent belief in purgatory stimulated social 
differentiation, individualism and the concept of citizen. The orthodox world in contrast 
retained its black and white view of the world, interpreted by the ruler, resulting in 
collectivism and a lack of a civil society. Finally, the split of the Roman Catholic Church 
and the subsequent isolation of the Orthodox world reinforced the negative paths, since the 
East never went through the historical epochs that were important for the development of 
democracy and market economy – such as the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. 
Although it is stressed that Russia at some points in history (e.g. at the time of the Russian 
revolution in 1917) could have broken with its past, the origin of today’s situation is 
nevertheless traced 1600 years back in time (Gerner et al 1995 pp 108). 
Similar types of arguments have been expressed concerning the effects of the Ottoman 
occupation of the Balkans between the fourteenth and the twentieth century 
(Diamandouros & Larabee, 2000 pp 29). 
According to advocates of this perspective, when a country has a culture that is assumed 
to be detrimental to the development of a market economy and democracy, the prospects 
for turning the tables have been considered to be very difficult, since culture and mentality 
neither change very easily nor quickly (Gerner et al, 1995 p 106). 
An almost identical approach to the one discussed previously, but without the attempt to 
trace the origin of diverging political cultures, is the quite common view that prior 
democratic experiences are conducive to democracy, since they by definition prove the 
existence of a democratic political culture, thus making it much easier to revive 
democracy, even though a long time may have passed. Conversely, countries with no prior 
democratic experiences are believed to have major difficulties in establishing democracy, 
let alone in consolidating it (Bova 1993 p257-258). This argument is consistent with the 
assumption that a political culture does not change very easily, regardless of the extent of 
personal experiences of democratic rule in a country. Dictatorships may prevail from time 
to time, without erasing the population’s democratic memory. During the interwar years, 
most countries in Central Europe established democratic systems, while the Soviet Union 
and to a lesser extent some Balkan countries took a more authoritarian path. Even though 
democracy did not survive the inter-war period, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the 
memories of the short democratic period survived more than 50 years of non-democratic 
rule (Elster et al, 1998 p 304).  
In addition, when it comes to prior experiences of market economy, there are scholarly 
arguments, which state that memories of the system can be revived, a long time after it 
was abolished (Fischer, 2001 p 5). As was discussed previously regarding democracy, 
these experiences go back to the inter-war years, but they were disrupted by the 
Communist takeover in the region after World War II. Market economy was never fully 
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established in most of the territories belonging to the Soviet Union before the Bolsheviks 
came to power, and hence there was not much to revive after the fall of Communism.7  
A general conclusion is that distant past explanations have been applied to the outcomes 
of both the political and the economic transitions, but while it seems to be a quite common 
approach to the political transformation, it is much less frequently used in explaining the 
economic outcome. The approaches discussed above adhere to path dependency, which 
means that prior policy choices or events restrict the range of possible future choices, 
resulting in virtuous or vicious circles, which are very hard to break away from. According 
to this perspective the outcome of the Eastern European transitions is largely 
predetermined by legacies, which the policy makers in the region can do little to 
overcome. But as we shall see later, there are advocates of this perspective who 
nevertheless claim that there is scope for fundamental change during so-called formative 
moments. 
The recent past: the Communist experience  
The Communist period is generally regarded as having a negative impact on the prospects 
for democracy and market economy (Agh, 1998 p 51; Bunce, 1999 p 24-36), particularly 
psychologically by eliminating economic and political incentives, which resulted in apathy 
and passivity (Nodia, 1996 p 25).8 The duration of Communist rule is accordingly 
considered to be important for the prospects of reform (Nørgaard, 2000 pp 212). The 
effects of the old system are not viewed as uniform over the entire “East-bloc”, however, 
and these differences in turn have an impact on which course the transition has taken 
(McFaul, 2002 p 243). For some countries, e.g. the Soviet Union, Communism is 
perceived as a mere logical continuation of previous regimes and thus in accordance with 
the political culture and the state of the popular mentality, while for others – e.g. the 
Central European states – the imposition of Communist rule constituted a fundamental 
break with previous political and economic systems and a deviation from the existing 
political culture (Hahn, 1993 pp 302). The implication, which was addressed briefly in the 
previous section, is that the transition to democracy and market economy would be easier 
for countries, which had the ‘appropriate’ political culture but were forced to change paths, 
than for those who just continued along their ‘natural’ – and detrimental path. The former 
countries are assumed to be able to revive their political culture as soon as there is an 
opportunity, while the latter have no such political culture to revive and thus will continue 
along some form of authoritarian lines (Elster et al, 1998 pp 302).  In sum, a Communist 
system has few advantages in terms of democratization and marketization, but it has a 
smaller negative impact on countries, in which a civic and democratic political culture 
exists (Ibid p. 304).  
There are also differences between the East-bloc countries concerning the orthodoxy 
with which the Communist systems were run. During the reign of Josef Stalin there was 
little room for national deviations from the Soviet model, but after his death in 1953, the 
                                              
7 For a brief evaluation of the political cultural perspective, see Kubicek (2000), pp 298-300. 
8 van Brabant (1998:88) claims however that “the starting condition can rarely be termed unambiguously 
positive or negative for the pursuit of general transformation.” See also McFaul, (2002 p 242) for a similar 
argument. 
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satellite countries were allowed to pursue a more national form of Communism, as long as 
the Communist systems were not threatened. Poland and Hungary for example, 
experimented with small-scale market mechanisms and applied the most “liberal” or least 
repressive variant of totalitarianism (see van Brabant, 1998 p 88-99).9 Czechoslovakia also 
introduced far-reaching political reforms during the 1960s, but the reforms ended with the 
Soviet military intervention in 1968. Two influential scholars view these differences as the 
main factors behind the results of the transitions (Linz & Stepan, 1996; See also Bunce, 
1999). 
What was later to be termed transition theory, which focused on the strategic 
interactions of the elites as the main determinants for authoritarian breakdown and 
successful democratization, gradually emerged in the early 1970s (Grugel, 2002 p 57). The 
modernization theory, which dominated the theories on democratization in the 1950s and 
1960s, became fiercely criticized during the following decades for being too deterministic 
and for not paying attention to the political elites’ influence over the democratization 
processes (Ibid p. 60-62). Much of the criticism was due to the fact that the modernization 
theory was increasingly unable to explain why some countries – predominantly poor third-
world countries – succeeded in democratization, while some more affluent ones remained 
undemocratic. The transition theory became popular only in the mid 1980s, as a result of 
the publication of a seminal research project comparing the democratization processes in 
Southern Europe and Latin America (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Slightly modified, 
the new approach also became very influential in the research on the Eastern European 
transition half a decade later. One of the novelties, compared to the modernization 
approach, was the rejection of everything with a deterministic tone. Where modernization 
theorists saw socio-economic development as both a necessary and a sufficient condition 
for democratization, transition theorists dismissed the notions of necessity and sufficiency 
altogether, claiming instead that democracy could take root anywhere in the world, as long 
as a political elite – albeit small – with democratic ambitions existed (Shin, 1994). 
Although the contingency and uncertainty of the process was emphasized, it was not 
regarded as a totally random process. On the contrary and in accordance with the idea of 
path dependency, features of the old regime were assumed to influence the relevant actors’ 
strategies and room to maneuver, thereby making some transitional paths more likely than 
others.  
The most prominent advocates of this approach are Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996). 
Their main argument, slightly simplified, is that the more repressive the Communist 
regime, the more difficult the transition process, both in terms of initiation and outcome. 
For a successful transition to take place, a negotiated transition between the old 
(Communist regimes) and the new elites (the opposition) is regarded as the most 
facilitating mode of transition, but this mode was in turn only possible in countries where 
there were moderate forces on both sides, ready to bargain, like in Poland and Hungary. In 
the most repressive countries, like Romania, there was no room, neither for an opposition 
to emerge, nor for a reform-minded leadership. A regime collapse (in worst case a violent 
one) and a subsequent polarization between the political forces then becomes the only 
available path of transition (57 pp). This course in turn makes the democratic 
consolidation process more difficult because compromise and bargaining, rather than 
                                              
9 Linz & Stepan (1996) do not even regard Poland’s political system as totalitarian, but as authoritarian (p 
254). 
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polarization and conflict, are supposed to be features of a mature democracy. The old 
regime is thus not only believed to influence the transition to democracy, but also the 
subsequent consolidation process (p. 364).10 
A similar but slightly more institutional approach claims that countries with a higher 
degree of pluralism within the Communist systems, i.e. competing Communist institutions, 
with their own power base, were the ones that succeeded, while countries with one single 
omnipotent institution, with little scope for pluralism, have kept much of their institutional 
features intact, i.e. relinquished little power (Roeder, 2001 pp 22). 
In a critique against the pacted transition argument that is made by Linz & Stepan 
among others, McFaul (2002) claims quite to the contrary that the outcome of the 
transition has been successful in the countries where the democratic forces – often coming 
from the masses rather than from the elite -intransigently furthered their claims of total 
democratization, without making any compromises with the incumbent regime (p 228). 
Quite intuitively the conclusion is that only in the countries in which the democratic forces 
clearly dominated the transition process, was there a clear break with the past and a 
successful democratization, while countries in which undemocratic forces, i.e. the old 
regime dominated, resulted in continued dictatorships. Finally, in countries where the 
democratic and undemocratic forces were about equally strong, the democratization 
process seems to have stalled between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship (p 
213-214). 
Turning to the effects of the old regime on the economic transition, few economists 
seem to regard the outcome of the transition as determined or greatly influenced by the 
features of the old economic system.11 In a review article, which summarizes the last ten 
years of research on determinants of growth in the post-communist countries12, Oleh 
Havrlyshyn finds that initial conditions in terms of over-industrialization, price distortion, 
trade share, per capita income, natural resources etc, are regarded as important by most 
scholars, though they are given much smaller significance than the governments’ reform 
efforts and strategies (2001 p 61-79). The impact of initial conditions is most pronounced 
during the early years of the transition, but their importance quickly decline to the 
advantage of the reform policies that are pursued. Yet, they might have more explanatory 
power than scholars have found so far, since the linkage between initial conditions and 
reform ambitions have been neglected (Havrlyshyn, 2001 p 73). Economists thus seem to 
agree that transition actors to a fairly large extent have the ability to influence the outcome 
of the reforms, thereby making them responsible for failures. This implies, in turn that the 
explanation for the varieties in outcomes are to be found in the reform processes in the 
1990s or in the policy choices made in the aftermath of the events of 1989, which is the 
period under scrutiny in the following section. 
Although both political scientists and economists have emphasized the importance of 
the old regime for understanding the transition, the former have been more prone to stress 
the differences in the Communist systems throughout the region, which as was mentioned 
earlier, have led to different paths of transition and outcomes in terms of democratic 
                                              
10 McFaul (2002 p 243) argues in a similar vein that “… the balance of power and ideologies at the time of 
transition had path-dependent consequences for subsequent regime emergence.” 
11 Kolodko (1999) argues however that countries “that enjoyed a relative liberal system under socialism, the 
process of learning goes much faster” (p 251). 
12 Growth is in Havrlyshyn’s survey treated as a proxy for successful economic reforms. 
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consolidation. Economists on the other hand, tend to stress the similarities of the command 
economic systems, which hence cannot explain much of the differences in the outcomes of 
the transition. The focus of the economists lies elsewhere as will be discussed in the next 
section. From a political point of view then, the transitional countries are regarded as 
having different post-communist starting points, while the economists assume that the 
starting points in terms of economic reforms, are fairly similar.13 Consequently, the 
differences in the transitions to a functioning market economy is determined by the 
policies and strategies made by the post-communist governments in the region. Put 
differently, the actors are considered to have the necessary capacity to influence the 
outcome of the reform process.  
The formative moment of 1989: tabula rasa or path-dependency 
The choices made in the immediate aftermath of the events of 1989 naturally play an 
important role in explaining the economical and political outcome of the reforms (Fish, 
1998 & 1999; Kolodko, 1999 p 234; Elster et al, 1998 p 303). Two slightly different 
approaches will be discussed in this section, which both consider 1989 to be a formative 
moment, i.e. a period during which opportunities for fundamental changes are opened. The 
first is the traditional path-dependency approach advocated by historical institutionalists. It 
implies that countries, which are about to launch political and economic reforms, are 
constrained in their policy choices by their legacies. All options are simply not available to 
everyone (Bunce, 2003 p  190). When the choices concerning political system, 
constitutional framework, economic reform strategy etc have been made, the country in 
question will have to adhere to these choices until a new formative moment arrives, 
regardless of how the new institutional framework and policies function.  
The second perspective - the “tabula rasa” approach - views the options available during 
formative moments differently. With the collapse of the Communist regimes, the countries 
were left in a political and economical institutional void, thereby giving the actors 
involved a clean slate or a tabula rasa14 and a wide range of policy options to choose from, 
which opposes the path-dependent emphasis on limited choices (Hellman, 1998; Kolodko, 
1999). Both perspectives, however, stress the difficulties of fundamental changes once the 
‘table is laid’ (Fish, 1999 p 807). Transition actors thus play a fairly large role for the 
outcome of the transition in both approaches, in particular for the proponents of tabula 
rasa.  
We have now moved from perspectives in which historic legacies are the key to 
understanding and explaining the outcomes of the transitions, to more actor-oriented 
approaches, in which the institutions created and the policy strategies pursued are 
considered to render the legacies of the past irrelevant (Kopecky & Mudde, 2000 p 527; 
Fish, 1999 p 799). There has naturally been a lot more debate – both academic and 
political – over optimal strategies and choices than about historic legacies, since the latter 
are a fact, which cannot be changed, whereas the results of specific strategies can be 
learned from and hopefully corrected. The debate about the economic aspects of transition 
                                              
13 It should be noted however that economists consider the initial conditions to be similar regarding the 
economic system, while the countries clearly differed in terms of socio-economic indicators.  
14 Other labels for this phenomenon are windows of opportunity and extraordinary politics. 
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has been much more heated, than the debate about political change. The reason is that the 
consensus among scholars has been overwhelming concerning the political goals 
(democracy, respect for human rights and minorities etc), how to reach them (by holding 
free and fair elections, adopt and implement constitutional and other legislative 
amendments among other things) and the preferable speed (as quick as possible), whereas 
economists differ on all these issues (Goal: a market economy, but with an Anglo-Saxon 
liberal approach or a Nordic intervening welfare state? How: liberalization or privatization 
first? Speed: shock therapy or gradualism?). Ideological differences were quite naturally, 
at the heart of the economic debate. 
Leaving the ideological aspects of the economic transition aside, the scholarly debate 
has been about the speed and sequence of the reforms. Both proponents of shock therapy 
or big bang, a strategy that is also called the Washington consensus, and the gradualists (or 
evolutionary institutionalists) share the opinion that it is possible to create a clean slate at 
the onset of economic reform, by razing the old system to the ground, and that the policy 
choices made in the immediate aftermath could be very difficult to alter at a later stage. 
They fundamentally disagree, however, on whether a clean slate should be created and 
whether creating a situation of irreversibility is desirable for achieving a functioning 
market economy (Roland, 2001 p 34). The advocates of shock therapy are in favor of 
doing just that, thus making any backsliding to the old system impossible and preventing 
powerful organized interests from halting the reform process half way, in a position 
favorable to themselves rather than to the country as a whole (Hellman, 1998). The 
gradualists on the other hand claim that irreversibility is harmful by definition, because it 
excludes the possibility of policy changes or adjustments even in cases where a policy 
does not work properly. They opt instead for incremental reforms that are easily adjustable 
in the event of failure. The latter argument is the second point of disagreement. While the 
gradualists argue that piecemeal reforms are needed and that an institutional framework 
has to be in place before major reforms can be initiated (Kolodko, 1999 p 234-237), the 
proponents of shock therapy claim that partial reforms inevitably lead to the capture or 
hijacking of the transition by powerful actors (Hellman, 1998 p 232; Roland, 2001 p 34). 
In addition, institutions will be established in response to the newly created incentives. The 
bone of contention between proponents of shock therapy and gradualists is that the former 
dismiss the possibility to craft a transition process in any detail and they therefore suggest 
a complete and quick break with the past and the launching of comprehensive reforms, 
thereby creating new economic incentives to which people will adapt quickly. A market 
economy will be established when people react rationally to these incentives. The 
gradualist approach, thus, puts a lot more faith in the transition actors’ abilities to create a 
market economy than do proponents of shock therapy. 
Political scientists also tend to view the events of 1989 as an important moment for the 
prospects of democratization and marketization. In a frequently quoted article, Steven Fish 
(1998) suggests that the outcomes of the first free elections had a profound impact on the 
future of the economic reforms and, hence on the successful transition to a market 
economy. Quite intuitively, the study concludes that the countries, in which reform-
minded parties came to power, have been the most successful ones. They immediately 
launched comprehensive and to some extent irreversible reforms, which subsequent 
governments could not and would not roll back, since former Communists quickly tended 
to reform themselves in these countries. The victory of the opposition, moreover, 
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stimulated the opening of the political system. By contrast, in countries where the former 
Communists won the first election, the transition was more hesitant and incomplete, 
resulting in a context, which was more hostile towards reforms (pp. 58). This study thus 
constitutes a typical example of a path-dependent approach, since the outcome of a single 
event early in the transition process, is perceived to put the countries on different reform 
paths – negative and positive – with only limited opportunities to change paths. 
Another example is offered by Elster et al (1998), who compare the impact of legacies, 
institutional choices around 1989 and the policies pursued after 1989 on the consolidation 
of the market economy and democracy. The conclusion is that the institutional choices are 
the most important explanatory factors, because they create new incentives and habits, 
which are self-reinforced in virtuous and vicious circles, thereby eradicating legacies from 
the past (pp. 296).  
Turning to the purely political aspect of the transition, the single most important choice 
in terms of democracy was to adopt new constitutions and particularly crucial was the 
establishment of the new division of power. As mentioned in the previous section, scholars 
who adhere to the path dependence approach view much of the constitution making as an 
endogenous process, in which the old systems determine the structure of the new one 
(Roeder, 2001). Proponents of the tabula rasa approach, consider this process an 
exogenous one, in which the outcome is a result of the preferences and relative strength of 
the actors involved (Fish, 1999).  
The effects of political systems on the prospects for democratization, democratic 
sustainability and economic performance have been the target of interest from social 
scientists for a long time. Even though there is no consensus on whether a parliamentary or 
a presidential system is the most preferable, scholars seem to agree that concentration of 
power has a negative impact on democratization and democratic stability in general 
(Shugart & Carey; 1992; Linz & Valenzuela, 1994). This argument is also raised in the 
case of the Eastern European transition. Fish (1999 pp 803& 2001 pp 82) argues that 
democratic erosion, i.e. a backsliding from initially democratic or semi-democratic 
structures, is explained by the power vested in the presidencies of the post-communist 
countries. The more power invested in the presidency the less flexibility in the case of a 
deadlock or malfunctioning, and the fewer constraining or balancing institutions in case of 
a drift towards authoritarianism. The institutions hypothetically preventing for example 
Lech Walesa and Ion Iliescu15 from enhancing their respective powers, which may have 
had resulted in democratic breakdown did not exist in the former Soviet republics in 
Central Asia, thus facilitating the imposition or in some cases the continuation of 
dictatorship. The parliamentary systems, adopted mainly in the Western parts of the 
region, on the other hand have been much more stable democratically (Gill, 2000 p 179-
181). 
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, a common assumption of the proponents 
of this perspective is that changes are difficult to accomplish once the initial choices are 
made. One of the main arguments for a shock therapy approach is that incomplete reforms 
lead to an impasse, in which actors who benefit from the current situation become 
powerful enough to resist further reforms. “Actors who enjoyed extraordinary gains from 
the distortions of a partially reformed economy has fought to preserve these gains by 
                                              
15 Lech Walesa was president in Poland 1990 - 1995 and Ion Iliescu was president in Romania 1990 – 1996 
and 2000 – 2004. 
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maintaining the imbalance of partial reforms over time” (Hellman, 1998 p 232). 
Paradoxically, it might even be better to withhold reforms altogether, than to initiate 
incomplete ones (Ibid). In contrast, the gradualist approach, views incremental changes as 
both possible and desirable (Kolodko, 1999).  
Changing political systems fundamentally is also bound to be difficult, even if the 
system does not work properly. The main reason for this is that the power that is 
distributed to actors and institutions may easily be used to resist changes that threaten their 
power. For example, a system, which requires the president’s consent for diminishing the 
power of the presidency, will not change very easily in this respect. To put it differently, 
once it is established, the concentration of power, which is assumed to have negative 
consequences for the development of democracy, is very hard to break up. The parallel 
with the economic interests, which was previously discussed, is obvious. 
To sum up this section briefly, the events of 1989 are in principle treated quite 
similarly, politically and economically. Transition actors are considered to be quite 
influential during the formative moment - even if some scholars stress the limitation of the 
available choices - but they are considerably less influential once the choices are made.  
In the next section purely actor-oriented approaches, which regard the policies pursued 
after 1989 to be the most important factor for the transition outcome, will be addressed.  
Post-communism unconstrained 
The last perspective on the transition process emphasizes the policies pursued after 1989 
as the most important factor behind success and failure.16 Because the actors’ ability to 
influence the process, according to this perspective, is perceived to be high, the outcome of 
the reform is determined by the willingness and ambition of the decision-makers to 
reform, on the one hand, and by their competence and resources to do ‘the right thing’ on 
the other. These claims are self-evident, since no post-communist country will be reformed 
automatically (van Brabant, 1998 p 499) and will not be successful pursuing the ‘wrong’ 
policies (Åslund et al, 2001). The bone of contention is rather which policies are the right 
ones and in relation to which goals, particularly concerning the economy. 
The majority of the literature on transition, particularly studies that are descriptive in 
nature, which merely present the facts and events since 1989, fall in this category 
(Kopecky & Mudde, 2000 p 519). There are, however, also studies which explicitly deny 
the influence of past legacies and previous policy choices, claiming that anything can be 
done at anytime thereby placing much of the responsibility for failure and the credit 
success on the policy makers (Fish, 1999 p 796-797).  
When the creation of a consolidated democracy is compared with the creation of a 
functioning market economy, the former process seems to be a lot easier as long as there 
are high ambitions in that regard. This view is substantiated by the fact that all the EU 
candidate countries fulfilled the political criteria before the economic ones. In comparison 
to the enormously costly economic reform programs, the costs for reforming the political 
                                              
16 Fish (1999) calls this the political constructivist approach, which claims that “[p]olitical struggles, actions, 
and choices that took place during and after the onset of transition (…) are more important than legacies for 
determining variation in trajectories of democratization. Regime outcomes are constructed through politics.” 
(p 799). 
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systems have been insignificant. In other words, there are fewer “external” constraints 
involved, and the blame for failing to achieve democracy and consolidated democratic 
institutions is thus placed on the most powerful policy-makers in each country; 
Lukashenka in Belarus, Meciar in Slovakia, Milosevic in Yugoslavia, to name just a few 
examples (Fish, 2001; McFaul, 2002 p 233). The credit for a successful democracy also 
tends to be given to influential political actors, such as Havel and Klaus in the Czech 
Republic (Elster, et al, 1998; McFaul, 2002 p 228), or to collectives such as governments 
that are committed to the EU and which generally adhere to the political conditions for 
membership.17 In contrast to the economic aspects of transition discussed in the following 
section, it seems relatively easy to achieve consensus about policy choices with respect to 
democratic consolidation. The policy-makers’ primary task is ‘simply’ to protect the 
democratic principles laid down in the constitution from being corrupted in practice.  
It seems much more difficult to establish a functioning market economy, and it takes 
both skills and luck to achieve that goal. It takes skills because the economic reform 
program is a complex and highly labor-intensive task and it takes luck because there are 
external factors, such as the international economic cycles, over which domestic actors 
have no control. As mentioned previously, there is a big debate over what strategy is the 
most conducive to a successful outcome, with the dividing line drawn between those who 
emphasize early and quick macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization and privatization, 
i.e. the Washington consensus and those arguing for a stable institutional foundation, prior 
to launching the reforms previously mentioned. Even though it is hard to tell to what 
extent it is the decisions made after 1989 or the ones made during that event that matter the 
most, the prevailing view among economists is that initial conditions and historic legacies 
are of minor importance compared to the strategies and policy choices pursued by the 
transition actors (Fischer, 2001 p 2; Havrylyshyn, 2001 p 72). As with the political 
transition discussed earlier, these policies – successful or not – are sometimes connected to 
specific transition actors, the Polish shock therapy architect Leszek Balcerowicz being one 
of the most prominent individuals in that respect. Governments that are eager to join the 
EU quickly are also regarded as important actors in taking advantage of a favorable 
context. Other actors are brought up by Åslund et al (2001): “The driving force of positive 
change has to be entrepreneurs who feel they are at a disadvantage because of the 
privileges of others” (p 105).  
Even though the responsibility for the outcome of the transition to a large extent is put 
on policymakers, few would deny the importance of external factors, which facilitate the 
economic and political transition process. The prospect of joining the European Union has 
of course been regarded as a major factor in this respect, stimulating continuous political, 
economic and administrative reforms (Kopecky & Mudde, 2000 p 531-532). Moreover, 
the EU has provided financial assistance to the candidate countries, thereby further 
enhancing their chances of a successful transition. In the former Soviet republics with the 
exception of the Baltic countries, these favorable external and geographical conditions do 
not exist - admittedly partly because of the absence or insufficiency of the reforms 
undertaken - and the political and economic leadership have had to manage the transition 
processes more or less on their own, unfortunately with considerably less success 
(Kopstein & Reilly, 2000 p 36).  
                                              
17 See footnote 3. 
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In summary, contemporary explanations for the outcomes of the transitions have many 
similarities concerning the economic and political aspects: Political and economic elites 
and the strategies they pursue concerning the economy are to a large extent viewed as the 
main determinants of success and failure.  
Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this review has been to demonstrate the richness of the transition literature 
concerning explanations for the political and economic outcomes, ranging from 
psychological structures, which originated thousands of years ago, to contemporary 
factors, which emphasize the importance of what politician A did “yesterday”.  
Even though there are many similarities between how economists (who almost 
exclusively deal with the economic transition) and political scientists (who study both 
economic and political transitions) treat the transition processes, which are manifested by 
the fact that all perspectives discussed in this chapter are represented in studies on the 
economic as well as the political transition, there are nevertheless some striking 
differences. Not surprisingly, economists tend to explain the outcome of the reform by 
looking at the recent development in the post-communist countries, rarely going back 
further than 1989 and often focusing on the post-communist period. The legacies of the 
past are thus downplayed and are to a large extent considered irrelevant for understanding 
the current situation. Instead, it is the policies pursued by the contemporary governments, 
which are believed to account for the outcome of the transition. The actors are thus 
considered powerful enough to override potentially facilitating or detrimental structures. 
The actors largely create the incentive structures themselves and change them as easily 
when they think it appropriate.  
Political scientists on the other hand focus more on historic legacies when explaining 
the outcomes of both political and economic transitions. Relatively few studies go much 
further back than the late nineteenth century, but many of them focus on pre-communist 
and Communist legacies. Studies focusing on the events of 1989 are also well represented, 
while far fewer regard the post-1989 period to be the most decisive one. Path dependency 
is to some extent part of almost every study emanating from the political science 
discipline. Actors are consequently considered to be much more constrained by historic 
legacies and past policy choices, giving them limited opportunities to influence the 
outcome.  
People who are looking for a clear answer to the question of what determines the 
outcome of economic and political transitions are bound to be disappointed when 
consulting research in this area. For people who realize that there are no simple 
explanations to complex processes, the research on transition offers an exciting diversity 
of perspectives and explanations, which stimulates further thinking and reflection on the 
historic and current mechanisms behind change and continuity. 
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